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a b s t r a c t
Abstract: This study found that doubling the level of democracy 
in Latin America reduces CO
2
 emissions per capita by up to 6%. 
This relationship is estimated by using a fixed effects panel system 
of equations for 19 Latin American countries, between 1995 and 
2008. Democracy acts as a conduit for increasing demands on 
environmental quality in Latin America, due to urban population 
growth and economic prosperity. Nevertheless, this study has, at 
least, two caveats: first it cannot unveil the long run relationship 
between democracy and environmental quality in the region; 
and, secondly, this study assumes that democracy entails positive 
outcomes for countries adopting this political system.
Keyword: Democracy, Environmental Quality, CO
2
 Emissions 
per Capita, Latin America, Panel System of Equations.
JEL Codes: C33, N46, Q53, Q56.
r e s u m e n 
Este estudio encontró que duplicar el nivel de democracia en 
América Latina reduce las emisiones de CO
2
 per cápita hasta en 
6%. Esta relación se calcula mediante el uso de un sistema de 
ecuaciones de panel con efectos fijos. La muestra incluye 19 países 
de América Latina, entre 1995 y 2008. Este estudio concluye que 
la democracia actúa como un conducto para la creciente demanda 
de calidad del medio ambiente en América Latina, generada por 
el aumento de la población urbana y prosperidad económica en 
la región. Sin embargo, esta investigación tiene,  al menos, dos 
salvedades: en primer lugar, es ambigua sobre la relación de largo 
plazo entre democracia y calidad ambiental en la región; y, en 
segundo lugar, asume que la democracia trae beneficios positivos 
para los países que adoptan este sistema político.
Keyword: Democracia, Calidad ambiental, Emisiones de CO
2
 
per cápita, América Latina, Sistema de ecuaciones para datos de 
panel.
JEL Codes: C33, N46, Q53, Q56.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study claims that democracy has a positive effect on environ-
mental quality in Latin America, although previous papers find a 
positive (Farzin and Bond, 2006; Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2007), 
ambiguous (Buitenzorgy and Mol, 2011; You et al., 2015) or negative 
relationship (Midlarsky, 1998; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2013) between 
democracy and environmental quality.
Democracy acts as a conduit allowing social demands to be set as 
priorities by policymakers. Since more democracy implies more poli-
tical accountability, political activism, freedom of speech, freedom of 
press, and fosters social movements then environmental concerns may 
be incorporated in the political agenda. In fact, democracy guarantees 
that raising awareness is possible, hence influencing public opinion 
and electoral outcomes.
Although democracy is not the cure of all evils for Latin Ameri-
ca, it does vindicate political participation and protest as legitimate 
ways of influencing public policies, encouraging lower levels of co-
rruption, higher commitment to social demands and more equality. 
Thus, democracy promotes political participation and accountability, 
channeling environmental awareness toward action among citizens 
and policymakers.
Hence, Latin America, with an increasing urban population facing 
new issues besides global warming, would pressure for improvements 
in environmental quality. Public awareness should imply a higher 
demand for a cleaner environment and democracy would serve as the 
conduit for influencing the policy agenda.
In order to test the democracy-environmental quality relations-
hip, this paper will estimate a panel data system of equations for 19 
Latin American countries, for the period 1995-2008. This paper fills 
three gaps in the literature. First, no previous study has focused on 
Latin America. Second, this paper acknowledges the non-linear and 
indirect nature of democracy—via economic development. Third, 
this study provides policymakers with direct and indirect estimates 
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of democracy on environmental quality and alternative conduits that 
may encourage it throughout the region.
Finally, this paper is divided as follows. Section I comments on 
the previous literature on the topic. Section II lays out the concep-
tual framework, a model of political activism, the research question 
and hypotheses. Section III provides the results and tests the theory. 
Section IV depicts some of the limitations of this study. Lastly, some 
conclusions are presented.
2. PREvIOUs FINDINgs
The relationship between democracy and the environment has been 
studied for quite some time. Yet the link between them is dubious. 
In fact Midlarsky (1998) argues that the relationship between demo-
cracy and the environment is multidimensional. Midlarsky (1998) 
finds a negative relationship between democracy and carbon dioxide 
emissions, soil erosion by water and deforestation. Didia (1997) also 
finds a negative association between democracy and tropical defo-
restation. However, Li and Reuveny (2006) find that the effect of 
democracy on environmental quality varies across the different types 
of environmental degradation. 
Although Midlarsky (1998) finds, in most cases, an unexpected 
and inverse relationship between environmental quality and de-
mocracy, after controlling for other factors, his study accounts for 
cross-sectional data. Additional factors could be controlled for in a 
panel data approach. For example, Carlsson and Lundström (2000) 
show that government size and pro-market policies affect the impact 
that democracy has on environmental quality. These authors find 
that a large government size reduces and may eliminate the impact 
of democracy on reducing CO
2
 emissions, consistent with Bernauer 
and Koubi (2013). Nevertheless, Carlsson and Lundström (2000, p. 
2) acknowledge that economic freedom and political freedom have a 
relationship with GDP growth and GDP per capita, casting doubt on 
their estimates due to possible endogeneity.  
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In contrast, Neumayer (2002) finds that the more democratic a 
country is, the more multilateral agreements favoring the environ-
ment it signs. Yet there may be other driving factors in the author’s 
findings. For instance, Das and Dirienzo (2010) suggest that countries 
with moderate ethnic diversity are societies with more civil enga-
gement and are more democratic. Ethnically homogenous countries 
exhibit higher environmental standards. 
Farzin and Bond (2006) argue that income inequality, age 
distribution, education, and urbanization all affect the democracy-
environmental quality relationship and may reduce the importance of 
democracy as a conduit for reducing pollution levels, and education 
may have an ambiguous effect on environmental quality (Mayer, 
2013).
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) show that by including corruption 
into the analysis, the effects of democracy disappear. Their main 
conclusion is that countries with a democratic tradition are also 
less corrupt and thus prone to uphold environmental regulations. 
In contrast, Duit et al. (2009) are skeptic of the positive impacts of 
democracy on biodiversity. In fact, these authors conclude that none 
of the previously mentioned variables are as important as landscape 
transformations. 
In a more traditional angle that takes advantage of an Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve approach, Gallagher and Thacker (2008) find a 
negative yet long run relationship between the “stock” of democracy 
and sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions. However, this study omits 
corruption in their analysis. Yet, Aklin et al. (2014) claim that co-
rruption matters since its effects on environmental quality may be 
significant and are perceived differently varying with income and 
wealth levels of citizens.
Grafton and Knowles (2004), on the other hand, analyze the 
importance of social capital on environmental quality. The authors 
conclude that social capital can be a bad thing for the environment. 
Moreover, if social capital encourages population density, then it 
might even have a negative effect on environmental quality, since 
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the authors find a positive association between population density 
and environmental degradation. 
In contrast, Winslow (2005) suggests that democracy has a po-
sitive effect on reducing pollution (sulfur dioxide (SO
2
), suspended 
particulate matter (SPM) and smoke) in urban areas-where population 
density may be the highest.
Zavestoski et al. (2006) explain that democracy affects environ-
mental policies through the internet. The internet increases awareness 
of governmental policies, regulations and plans while providing an 
effective and cheap channel for exchanging ideas and grouping citi-
zens that share similar values and facilitating citizens' engagement 
in environmental issues. This political and social activism is feasible 
in democratic societies putting pressures on policymakers (Martinez 
et al., 2008). In turn, policymakers accommodate or modify laws 
and regulations to satisfy public demands-giving civil liberties an 
important role in explaining the democracy-environmental quality 
relationship (Bernauer and Koubi, 2004; Bernard et al., 2014), lea-
ding to higher environmental standards (Fredriksson et al., 2005).
Finally, the relationship between democracy and environmental 
quality might depend on the sample of countries included in the 
empirical analysis and the amount of accumulated democracy (Fre-
driksson and Neumayer, 2013). Arvin and Lew (2009), use a sample of 
developing countries in the period 1976-2003. The authors conclude 
that their results are dependent on the indicator of environmental 
quality they use and on the sub-sample they select. Their estimates 
are inconsistent across subsamples of developing countries, conclu-
ding that a democracy-environmental quality relationship may be 
spurious (Walker, 1999).
3. DEmOCRaCy aND ENvIRONmENTaL 
QUaLITy: ThE ThEORy
3.1. The Conceptual Framework
The relationship between democracy and environmental quality 
is ambiguous. Midlarsky (1998) argues that democracies may be 
revista de economía del caribe nº . 16 (2015) págs. 11-44 [17]
Danny García Callejas
ineffective in increasing environmental quality if interest groups 
favoring less environmental regulation have an important role. In 
other words, lobbyists—and elites—advocating for low or limited 
environmental regulations may influence policymaking more than 
other societal actors.
Setting aside the compelling arguments against the positive re-
lationship between democracy and environmental quality, this paper 
is focused on the positive outcomes (Schultz and Crockett, 1990; 
Congleton, 1992; and Payne 1995).
The argument of a positive relationship between democracy and 
environmental quality may be depicted as follows. More democracy 
implies more freedom of press, freedom of speech, human rights, 
equality and social justice. This creates a conduit conveying social 
needs through political participation. Democratic countries also allow 
for an easier exchange of information amongst its citizens raising 
public awareness and influencing public opinion. As their income 
and quality of life increases, societies demand more environmental 
quality shaping policy agendas. Consequently, regulations, interna-
tional agreements and local policies are created to fulfill these needs, 
encouraging a higher environmental quality (Concept map 1).
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There are four additional and independent channels that posi-
tively link democracy and environmental quality. First, democracy 
guarantees and encourages political rights and freedom of information 
for all individuals alike. This permits protests, social movements, 
opposition and raising awareness, fostering the creation of all types 
of interest groups, including those that favor the environment. These 
groups raise public concerns about environmental issues, encoura-
ging political parties to be formed or inducing politicians to include 
these topics in their political agendas to satisfy electoral preferences. 
Governments would adopt these demands through policies intended 
to protect the environment.
Second, democracy empowers all citizens by facilitating political 
activism, social mobilizations and debates about society’s problems. 
This induces the formation of political coalitions incorporating 
citizen’s preferences about the environment. Perhaps, most impor-
tantly, democracy encourages accountability, persuading policymakers 
to fulfill the requests of a cleaner environment.
Third, democratic societies are more respectful of rule of law, 
private property and international agreements. As pollution increa-
ses and affects private property through externalities, governments 
intervene. Similarly, as partner countries advance having a higher 
preference for the environment, the home countries is compelled to 
sign equivalent treaties. Because of private property, governments 
implement pro-market and pro-government policies promoting an 
environmental sustainable behavior.
Finally, democracy implies social inclusion and economic equality. 
Empowered citizens would require government to punish polluters 
favoring a cleaner environment (Concept map 2).
revista de economía del caribe nº . 16 (2015) págs. 11-44[20]
Voting for the Environment: The Importance of  
Democracy and Education in Latin America













































































3.2. Research Question and hypotheses 
The relationship between democracy and the environment in Latin 
America is ignored. This question is not serendipitous for at least 
three reasons. Firstly, the diversity of levels of GDP per capita and 
democracy in Latin America makes it an appealing case for explo-
ring additional theoretical underpinnings. Secondly, the availability 
of natural resources and biodiversity in Latin America may prove 
a paradoxical case where environmental quality may be low due to 
scarce political participation and not limited resources. Thirdly, the 
diverse levels of income inequality in the region suggest also poli-
tical inequalities, limiting environmental justice. Thus, this paper 
will answer the following research question: What is the impact of 
democracy on environmental quality in Latin America?
Additionally, the theory (§ II) encourages exploring three 
hypotheses:
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H1:  An increase in democracy improves environmental quality, 
in countries with low levels of education.
H2:  Higher levels of education increase environmental quality, 
in countries with low levels of democracy.
H3:  An increase in GDP per capita reduces environmental quality.
3.3. a model of Pollution and Political activism
This section develops a model in which there are two groups of active 
constituents: one promoting environmental pollution (polluters); 
and environmentalists pursuing a cleaner environment. Imagine 
right-wing and left-wing activists, being the former more prone to 
polluting policies when in power (Garmann, 2014).
Each period there is a share of the population politically active. 
Among the politically engaged citizens, there is a fraction P of indi-
viduals in favor of pollution and a percentage NP of citizens against 
contamination.
The government establishes anti-pollution laws and legislation, 
yet it is influenced by polluters and environmentalists alike. But, 
when citizens consider that official decisions are against society’s 
best interest, then the ruling party may be removed from office. In 
this case, β is the probability that the government will stay in power 
after accepting a high level of pollution.
First, agents must decide if they engage in politics promoting high 
or low levels of pollution. Second, the government must decide if it 
intervenes in favour or against environmental legislation. Third, after 
all agents have decided on their actions and acted, payoffs are paid 
and government may continue or be removed from office (Figure 1).
Agents decide if 
engaging in politics 
favouring pollution.
→
Government decides if 
intervening in fostering 
pollution legislation.
→
Payoffs are paid and 
government may be 
removed from office.
Figure 1. Timing in the first period (t)
Hence, the expected utilities of economic agents gaining from 
high pollution and low pollution are:
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UHt = Pr
a
t { θw (1 - β) G - C} + (1 - Pr
a
t) { θwG - ςC} 
ULt = Pr
p





 is the probability that the government in power will accept 
a high level of pollution; Prp
t
 is the probability that the government 
in power will seek legislation— if there is none—for a high level 
of pollution. θ
w
 is the probability of the pollution project being ac-
cepted without government interference, and θ
g
 the probability of 
the project being approved given government intervention. G is the 
benefit for society of the approved polluting project and C its cost. ς 
is the percentage of loss on government intervention if the project is 
rejected. β is the probability that the government will stay in power 
after accepting a high level of pollution.
Government will not intervene if the utility for agents from a high-
polluted environment is less than from a low polluted environment.
Prpt {(θg - θw)G} ≤ Pr
a
t {(1 - ς)C + βθg G} + ςC
In period t, if there is a high level of pollution, the gain for eco-
nomic agents with government seeking to reduce contamination or 
promoting a high level of pollution are the following:
Urt = A + ρκUt+ i
UPt = A + C + ρ(1 - β)κUt+ i - Φ(Pr
a
t)
Where A is government popularity; ρ is a discount factor; U
t+1
 is the 
future gain for the economy as a consequence of the level of pollution; 
Φ(Pra
t
) is the cost of promoting a high level of pollution that is de-
creasing in the probability that the government in power will accept 
a high level of pollution (Pra
t
); and κ is the proportion of politically 
active individuals in society and depends positively of the level of 
democracy and education (so κ = f (Education and Democracy)).
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Economic agents will abstain from promoting a high level of 





ρκ βUt+ i ≥ C - Φ(Pr
a
t)
In period t, if there is a low level of pollution, the gain for econo-
mic agents with government seeking to maintain low contamination 
or promoting an increase in the level of pollution are the following:
UMt = A + ρκUt+ i
UIt = A + ρ(1 - ε)κUt+ i
Where ε is the probability that government will continue in 






,  meaning that ε ≠ 0, then government will always 
seek a low level of pollution, if there is a chance of being removed 
from office if doing otherwise (e.g. creation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, EPA, by Nixon in 1970). The idea is that gover-
nments are unwilling to lose power by committing political suicide.
Suppose there are two fractions of the population: polluters (P) 
who are citizens politically active that favour pollution; and, non-
polluters (NP) that are politically engaged environmentalists. Then 
we have that {P, NP} would represent the state of the economy in 
period t. Yet in period t+1, the state of the economy will depend on 
the actions of these individuals in the previous period.
Case 1. Suppose that economic agents are not promoting legis-
lation favouring pollution (high level of pollution) by lobbying 
government in period t.
NPt+ i = κNPt + {κεNPt + (1 - κ)}NP
Pt+ i = κ(1 - ε)Pt + {κεPt + (1 - κ)}P
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Case 2. Suppose that economic agents are promoting legislation 
favouring pollution (low level of pollution) by lobbying government 
in period t and government supports such efforts.
NPt+ i = κNPt + {κβNPt + (1 - κ)}NP
Pt+ i = κ(1 - β)Pt + {κβPt + (1 - κ)}P
In contrast to Case 1, epsilon is now replaced by beta. What is 
the steady state for the symmetric equilibrium? In this case I will 
present the solution for the second case, agents promoting a higher 
level of pollution for the economy. Thus,
NPPP =
1 - κ - κβ
NP




1 - κ - κβ(1 - P)
And the gain for economic agents with a government seeking an 
increase in the level of pollution is the following:




{A +C - Φ(PP)}
1 - ρ(1 - β)κ
Yet κ is directly related to education and democracy thus im-
plying that a higher level of both factors should lead to less pollution. 
Although if A, the level of popularity, is directly related to GDP per 
capita, a first testable equation would imply:
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Pollution = f(Democracy, Education, GDP per capita)
                 –                    –                        +
3.4. Conceptual Elements for Testing the Theory
The previous framework suggests a positive relationship between 
environmental quality and democracy, emphasizing on the role of 
social movements, freedom of information, political participation 
and economic development. 
Environmental quality is a concept encompassing many aspects. 
This creates a first hurdle for determining the dependent variable of 
interest. A first possibility is using the Environmental Performance 
Index developed by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and 
Policy. However, using this index would limit the sample size and 
accuracy of the analysis. The data is plagued with missing data for 
the period of analysis, 1995-2008, and for a large group of Latin 
American countries.
An attractive alternative is using CO
2
 Emissions per capita as a pro-
xy for environmental quality. This variable poses several advantages. 
First, with the world’s awareness on climate change, it has become 
a primary target and concern for the public. Second, it is more per-
ceptible in urban areas than other pollutants because car and buses 
are primary emitters. Third, carbon dioxide is linked to respiratory 
illnesses that reduce quality of life, raising concerns from the public. 
Fourth, transportation is a major concern in Developing Countries 
with a close connection to carbon emissions, an indicator for citizens 
of the overall environmental quality in urban areas.
Furthermore, data on carbon dioxide emissions should be relatively 
accurate given the importance of the issue on a worldwide scale and 
the availability of different sources. However, using CO
2
 emissions 
has its caveats. First, emissions are concentrated in urban areas, ex-
cluding policies and environmental programs targeted for rural areas. 
This is troublesome because Latin America depends heavily on its 
mining sector. Yet, environmental quality in urban areas should be 
positively correlated with those in rural areas. Second, urban citizens 
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are influenced by media and world media regarding the environment. 
This may skew their perceptions on the true impacts of emissions 
and on their perceived level of environmental quality.  
On the independent side of the equation, the theory suggests social 
movements as a first element. Social movements catalyze citizens’ 
demands regarding environmental concerns. These movements are 
pivotal in reshaping state policies and influencing voting preferences. 
However, data on social movements is difficult to acquire in a panel 
data context for Latin America. Thus a proxy is in order. Youth has 
a pivotal role in shaping society (Youniss et al. 2002). Younger indi-
viduals are more risk-taking (France, 2000) and thus more inclined 
to civic engagement and political participation; younger and more 
educated individuals are more prone to environmental social move-
ments than other groups of the population (Strandbu and Krange, 
2003); and teenagers are highly interested in issues related to the 
environment (Hager, et al. 2007). Therefore, it is reasonable to pro-
xy social movements with a percentage of youth in the population. 
Education also plays a crucial role in fostering social movements and 
raising awareness. Rather than youth being the sole proxy for social mo-
vements, education should be included as a factor promoting efficacy and 
advocacy. Yet education is an abstract concept. What level of education 
or should all levels of instruction be included? Tertiary education is the 
most effective in encouraging civic engagement and political participa-
tion (Hoskins et al., 2008; World Bank, 2002, p. 32). Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to proxy education with tertiary education.
As also mentioned in the theory, the level of political activism 
is not only influenced by education and social movements but by 
the percentage of the population located in urban areas. Urban areas 
enable networking and social relations that also encourage gatherings 
and social mobilizations. Indeed, a high concentration of population 
in one area facilitates social discussion. Thus, the percentage of urban 
population is included as one of the factors that may explain envi-
ronmental quality. Also, higher concentrations of population may 
improve economic and environmental efficiency in the provision of 
goods and services, leading to lower levels of emissions. Hence, a 
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negative relationship is expected between the percentage of urban 
population and environmental quality.
Another factor to consider from the theory is economic development. 
Societies with higher levels of economic development are associated 
with less economic inequality—although not linearly—(Kuznets, 
1955), and more available resources in society that may finance pro-
grams intended to improve the environment (Shafik, 1994, p. 758). 
This should facilitate political participation, leading to higher levels of 
environmental quality. How to measure economic development? This 
study adopts GDP per capita as a proxy for economic development. 
Although not a perfect measure, it is a reliable indicator, easier to 
explain by other components and assess indirect impacts.
The theory also suggests that corruption affects the level of 
environmental quality by reducing the effectiveness of democracy. 
Corruption enables interest groups to influence the political agenda 
in an unfairly manner. Besides, it provides corporations, institutions 
and individuals an alternative for breaking the law, perhaps without 
getting caught. This maintains or increases pollution even if the 
current legislation requires a reduction. 
Although corruption may highlight the disparities of power and 
income in society, inequality serves as a better factor in measuring 
those disparities. Unequal societies enable power disparities to grow 
in the political arena. Privileged groups accommodate policies in 
their favor hurting the powerless. This derives in a political agenda 
prioritizing the interests of those with power. For example, polluting 
plants and factories could be located close to workers in low-income 
communities. Since environmental justice would prove ineffective in 
this case, then low environmental quality arises.
In summary, the independent variables explaining environmental 
quality are: democracy, economic development, social movements 
and political participation (including freedom of information and of 
press). However, these concepts are proxied through variables available 
and measured for Latin America. The proxies are: a democracy index, 
percentage of youth, gross percentage of the population in tertiary 
education, perceived corruption, level of inequality, percentage of 
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urban population and GDP per capita. The primary equation to esti-
mate and its expected signs are:
CO
2
 Emissions per capita =f (Democracy, Youth, Education, Corruption,
            –          –            –                  +
 Inequality, Urban Population, GDP per capita)
            +                    –                          +
(1)
However, this equation overlooks the indirect effects that spur 
from Democracy through GDP per capita (Goldsmith, 1995; Barro, 
1996; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Feng, 1997; Rivera-Batiz, 2002). Howe-
ver, the GDP per capita democracy relationship would be inaccurate if 
only democracy is included in the equation. Thus, including growth 
components suggested by the neoclassical theory of growth (Solow, 
1956; Becker et al., 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Barro, 
1991) would point to a second equation as follows:
GDP / Population = GDP per capita =f(Education, Democracy, Capital, Trade)
                         +                +             +         +
(2)
In conclusion, a comprehensive analysis of the effects of democracy 
on environmental quality should at least include the indirect effect 
from economic growth. Furthermore, democracy should also affect the 
level of environmental quality through the economic growth equa-
tion. This indirect effect should be considered if one does not want 
to overestimate the effect of democracy on environmental quality.
4. DEmOCRaCy aND ENvIRONmENTaL 
QUaLITy: ThE EmPIRICaL RELaTIONshIP
4.1. The Data
The source for CO
2
 data is CDIAC (2015) and World Bank (2015). 
The variables youth and education were taken from the World Bank 
(2015) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean –ECLAC– (2015). The variable youth is the percentage 
of people between ages 15 and 24 for a specific year and country. 
Education is the tertiary gross school enrolment rate.
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The variable democracy is taken from the Polity IV database 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2015), that defines democracy as a form of 
government that “relies mainly on the use of ‘positive sanctions/
incentives’ (i.e., legitimate authority) to manage the political agenda 
and to ensure social order” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2015). This variable 
ranges originally from -10 to +10, where +10 indicates the highest 
level of democracy and -10 a hereditary monarchy. However, this 
index for democracy takes only positive values for the Latin American 
countries in the sample for the period 1995-2008.
As an indicator of economic progress, this study uses GDP per 
capita. This variable is taken from World Bank (2015) and ECLAC 
(2015). The base year for this variable is 2000 and it is measured in 
U.S. dollars. Similarly, capital is the amount of fixed capital in the 
economy and is also measured in 2000 year dollars, and taken from 
ECLAC (2015). Despite the criticism of using this variable, including 
investment rather than capital is not free of drawbacks as well. Trade 
is the level of trade openness in the economy or imports plus exports 
by GDP, and its source is also World Bank (2015) and ECLAC (2015). 
The data on corruption is taken from Transparency International 
(2015). This index or the corruption perception index is measured 
in a 0 to 10 scale where a higher value represents a lower level of 
corruption or more transparency. Transparency International defines 
corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” Yet the 
level of disparities and asymmetries of power are captured through 
income inequality. The data is taken from the United Nations 
University–World Institute for Development Economics Research, 
UNU-WIDER (2014), data base on income inequality.
However, the possibility of social movements, provision of public 
services and political participation are more effective in urban areas. 
This paper uses the percentage of urban population taken from World 
Bank (2015) and ECLAC (2015) to measure the percentage of people 
living in urban areas. 
All variables are available for the 19 Latin American countries 
in the data set and for the period 1995-2008. The following are the 
countries included in this study: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
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Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Only for the case of Jamaica, data 
on capital was imputed using historical data on capital and balance 
of payments. Imputed data was compared to actual data for the other 
countries in the region and, in general, both sets were correlated and 
without significant statistical difference. Furthermore, all estimations 
were consistent and robust to eliminating Jamaica from the data set.
4.2. Data Reliability and sample selection
This study intends to include as many Latin American countries as 
possible. Yet data is only complete and available for 19 countries in the 
region. This sample is representative of Latin America considering it 
embodies 94% of the population, 98% of GDP and 94% of CO
2
 emis-
sions for the entire region, according to ECLAC statistics. These three 
indicators are directly connected to the issue at hand in this paper.
The 1995-2008 time frame for this sample of countries is parti-
cularly adequate. First, data is complete, available and statistically 
sound for the selected sample of countries. This is expressly important 
for the data on pollution—emissions—, inequality and democracy. 
Since these three indicators are tricky to measure, their estimates 
tend to change over time, due to improvements in their measurement 
methodology. The data, for this period, has been validated and forgoes 
any future changes, making it reliable and accurate.
Second, this period of time presents sufficient variability in de-
mocratic, environmental and economic indicators in order to perform 
the suggested econometric estimations in this study. Since data for 
previous years is inexistent for several variables, and later values are 
tainted by less variability and reliability, this time frame turns out 
to be adequate. Capital estimates are troublesome but reliable for 
the selected time period. 
Third, the 2008 economic crisis created recessions in 9 out of the 
19 countries in the sample. However, only 4 suffered from a con-
traction in the second or third quarter of 2008. This is particularly 
important because changes in political preferences, social demands 
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and social unrest began late in 2008 in a minority of countries, and 
especially ignited in 2009. The relative stability of the previous period 
minimizes the risk of economic turmoil affecting political preferences.
In consequence, these three reasons justify using the data available 
for the 1995-2008 time window. By capturing consistent estimates, 
minimizing any possible volatile structural changes, having reliable 
estimates of economic, environmental and democratic indicators, and 
sufficient data for a representative sample of the region, the empirical 
exercise of this study reduces doubts on its results.     
4.3. Estimation strategy
Latin America is an interesting case to analyze because of its unique 
characteristics in terms of democracy and economic development. 
Data is available for a variety of countries and several years enabling 
a panel data approach.
The use of panel data increases degrees of freedom combining cross-
section and time series data simultaneously. The fixed effects approach 
allows controlling for unobservable confounding factors that may 
otherwise skew and invalidate the estimates and statistical inference. 
The system of equations to be estimated has as dependent variables 
the logarithm of CO
2
 Emissions per capita and the logarithm of GDP 
per capita. The following is the system to be estimated:
Log(CO2 Emissions per capita)it = β10 + β11* Log(Democracy)it  
+ β12*Log(Youth)it + 
β13*Log(Youth)*Log(Democracy)it +  
β14*Log(Education)it +  
β15*Log(Democracy)*Log(Education)it +  
β16* Log(Youth)* Log(Education)it +  
β17*Log(Corruption) + β18*Log(Inequality) 
+ β19*Log(Urban Population) +  
β20*Log(GDP per Capita)it + ε1it
(3)
                 Log(GDP per capita)it = β20 + β21* Log(Education)it +  
β23*Log(Democracy)it + β24*Log(Capital)it + 
β25*Log(Trade)it + ε2it
(4)
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Nevertheless, equation 3 is estimated first and separately in order 
to confirm the robust nature of the estimates. This study acknowled-
ges that estimating only equation 3 would provide an incomplete 
assessment and overestimating the effect of the independent variables 
on environmental quality (CO
2
 Emissions per capita). Since democra-
cy influences the level of GDP per capita and through it the level of 
environmental quality, any estimation should control for that effect if 
estimates are to be accurate.
Notice that education is proxied with tertiary education. Tertiary 
education is the most effective level of academic formation in encou-
raging civic engagement and political participation (Hoskins et al., 
2008; World Bank, 2002, p. 32). However, the extent to which civic 
and political engagement affects policy is magnified by the partici-
pation of youth, thus an interaction term for education and youth is 
included. Similarly, the level of democracy limits the possibility of 
civic engagement to influence policy and environmental regulations. 
Moreover, education may foster civic engagement, but this is only 
possible if it is democratically feasible. In other words, higher levels 
of education in a dictatorship restrict the possibilities for civic en-
gagement. Consequently, this requires for interaction terms between 
democracy, youth and education. 
In this case, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may prove an inefficient 
estimation method. Notice that equations 3 and 4 are affected by 
exogenous shocks that have incidence on the value of all variables. 
Specifically, the Mexican peso crisis that began in December of 1994 
affected commerce throughout the region; the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis and the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis that ignited the 1998 
Brazilian Financial Crisis altered the financial stability of Latin Ame-
rica. These exogenous effects act in each equation through the error 
terms suggesting that both equations are related. Thus, the most 
efficient strategy is estimating this system of equations by Seeming 
Unrelated Regression (Zellner, 1962 and 1963). This method will 
provide consistent estimates with more accuracy than OLS.   
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4.4. Findings and Estimates
Table 1 provides the estimates for a one-equation panel data model. 
The dependent variable is CO
2
 Emissions per capita—proxy for envi-
ronmental quality. All estimates are significant—for models 1 through 
3—suggesting a negative relationship between democracy, youth and 
education, evaluated at sample means—due to interaction effects; a 
consistent result with this study’s conceptual framework. Also, GDP per 
capita has a positive relationship with emissions, as expected (§ II). In 
contrast, corruption, inequality and urban population are insignificant. 
Table 1. Latin America: Panel Data Estimations 
exploring the relationship between CO
2
 Emissions 
per capita and Democracy, 1995-2008 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log(CO
2
 Emissions per capita)
Log(Democracy) -6.164* -5.926* -6.916* -2.811**
(-2.440) (-2.670) (-3.150) (-2.520)
Log(Youth) -4.284* -4.293* -3.843* -1.771**
(-3.030) (-3.300) (-3.060) (-2.350)
Log(Youth)*Log(Democracy) 1.496** 1.424* 1.719* 0.797**
(2.450) (2.600) (3.200) (2.530)
Log(Education) -1.725* -1.846* -0.622* -0.067**
(-2.970) (-3.500) (-2.600) (-2.120)
Log(Democracy)*Log(Education) 0.273** 0.277* 0.261** ---
1.980 (2.520) (2.420) ---
Log(Youth)*Log (Education) 0.308** 0.340* --- ---
(2.210) (2.650) --- ---
Log(Corruption) -0.057 --- --- ---
(-1.510) --- --- ---
Log(Inequality) 0.056 --- --- ---
(0.410) --- --- ---
Log(Urban Population) 0.077 --- --- ---
(0.210) --- --- ---
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 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.503* 0.499* 0.457* 0.474*
(4.840) (4.750) (4.560) (4.760)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.6108 0.5971 0.5871 0.5824
Observations 266 266 266 266
Notes: * Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. T-statistics are in parentheses. Time 
fixed effects were not significant. Constants are included but are not shown. Random effect 
models provided similar estimates. Pooled effects and random effects were tested but not 
reported; results suggested fixed effects over the other two.
The estimates from model 1 in Table 1 imply that democracy, 
education and youth matter in determining the impact of these 
variables on environmental quality, providing evidence for H1 and 
H2. This means that increasing democracy as a way of improving 
environmental quality is ineffective in countries with high levels of 
education (evidence in favor of H1). Hence, education provides an 
alternative conduit for channeling environmental demands of the 
population and improving environmental quality.
Similarly, the results also suggest that democracy may prove in-
effective in reducing emissions in countries with a high percentage 
of youth. Indeed, youth are also a natural alternative for increasing 
environmental quality. In part, this is because youth tend to parti-
cipate more of social movements than any other age group. Also, a 
higher percentage of youth ignites altruistic behaviors among older 
age groups of the population indented to protect the environment 
for future generations.
Also, GDP per capita is positive and significant, suggesting that 
more development leads to less environmental quality (evidence 
in favor of H3). Although the Kuznets hypothesis suggests that 
this relationship is non-linear and, after a threshold, higher levels 
of development imply more environmental quality, this first set of 
estimations reject this notion. 
In order to estimate the indirect effects of democracy on envi-
ronmental quality through GDP per capita, Table 2 uses a panel 
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data system of equations. Thus, Table 2 has two equations with the 
following dependent variables: CO
2
 Emissions per capita and GDP 
per capita. In Table 2 all estimates are significant at a 5% level and 
have the expected signs.   
Table 2. Latin America: Panel System of Two Equations 
Estimates exploring the relationship between CO
2
 
Emissions per capita and Democracy, 1995-2008 
Model 1 Model 2
Equation 1 Coefficient z-score P>|z| Coefficient z-score P>|z|
Log(CO
2
 Emissions per capita)
Log(Democracy) -5.964 -2.530 0.011 -6.972 -2.950 0.003
Log(Youth) -4.278 -3.360 0.001 -3.823 -2.980 0.003
Log(Youth)*Log(Democracy) 1.409 2.480 0.013 1.710 3.020 0.003
Log(Education) -1.933 -3.730 0.000 -0.685 -2.440 0.015
Log(Democracy)*Log(Education) 0.303 2.360 0.018 0.286 2.190 0.028
Log(Youth)*Log(Education) 0.346 2.840 0.004 --- --- ---
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.561 6.180 0.000 0.515 5.680 0.000




Log(Education) 0.058 4.710 0.000 0.058 4.720 0.000
Log(Democracy) 0.053 3.370 0.001 0.053 3.380 0.001
Log(Capital) 0.314 25.820 0.000 0.314 25.840 0.000
Log(Trade) 0.086 5.210 0.000 0.085 5.130 0.000
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R-square 0.498 0.498
Observations 266   266   
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Model 3 Model 4
Equation 1 Coefficient z-score P>|z| Coefficient z-score P>|z|
Log(CO
2
 Emissions per capita)
Log(Democracy) -2.515 -2.130 0.033 -2.598 -2.140 0.032
Log(Youth) -1.580 -2.070 0.038 -2.067 -2.840 0.005
Log(Youth)*Log(Democracy) 0.712 2.140 0.032 0.742 2.170 0.030
Log(Education) -0.074 -2.040 0.042 --- --- ---
Log(Democracy)*Log(Education) --- --- --- --- --- ---
Log(Youth)*Log(Education) --- --- --- --- --- ---
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.525 5.770 0.000 --- --- ---




Log(Education) 0.059 4.730 0.000 0.062 5.020 0.000
Log(Democracy) 0.053 3.380 0.001 0.054 3.420 0.001
Log(Capital) 0.314 25.820 0.000 0.312 25.600 0.000
Log(Trade) 0.085 5.110 0.000 0.079 4.770 0.000
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R-square 0.498 0.498
Observations 266   266   
Notes: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level. Time effects were insignificant. Constants were included 
in all models but are not reported. All models were fitted using Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Additio-
nal estimations included a quadratic term for Log(GDP per Capita) to test Kuznets’s Environmental Curve 
Hypothesis. The results, Log(CO
2
 Emissions per capita) = 3.149*Log(GDP per Capita) – 0.162*Log(GDP 
per Capita)2 include all control variables, suggesting a peak value of $16,984. This amount is beyond the 
maximum GDP per capita for any of the 19 Latin American countries in the sample. The squared term for 
GDP per capita is excluded from the models shown here.   
The results in Table 2 are consistent with those in Table 1. 
However, the indirect effect of democracy is now contemplated in 
the estimation. GDP per capita has a positive and linear relationship 
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favoring H3. A squared term for GDP per capita was included but it 
suggested a peak value of $16,984, ignoring that the highest GDP 
per capita in the data set is $9,917. The squared term for GDP per 
capita was excluded from all estimations.
The direct and indirect effects of democracy and education on 
environmental quality—negatively correlated to CO
2
 Emissions per 
Capita—from Table 2 are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Latin America: Path Analysis or Total 
Effect of a 10% increase in Democracy or Education 
on CO
2





 Emissions per capita in
Model 1 Model 2
Democracy -0.48% -0.60%
Education -0.73% -0.71%
Note: These path coefficients are based on estimates provided in Table 
2 and the overall sample means. Variables are assumed fixed at their 
sample mean. Estimates include direct and indirect effects.
Table 3 suggests that at sample mean values, a 10% increase in 
democracy and education reduces CO
2
 Emissions per Capita up to 
0.60% and 0.73%, respectively, implying a positive relationship 
between democracy, education and environmental quality. However, 
as suggested in Tables 1 and 2, these effects are conditioned by the 
level of education or democracy (evidence in favor of H1 and H2). 
In other words, countries with high levels of education may find 
that democracy has a negligible effect in reducing environmental 
quality. Similarly, countries with high levels of democracy may find 
that increasing education does not necessarily increase environmental 
quality. This emphasizes the fact that public policies targeted to im-
prove environmental quality cannot be replaced by simply increasing 
the levels of education or democracy.
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5. LImITaTIONs OF ThIs sTUDy
This paper uses CO
2
 emissions as and indicator of environmental 
quality; however this requires several words of caution. First, several 
studies have shown that results may vary by environmental indicator. 
Thus, the evidence presented in this paper is only suggestive of the 
impact of democracy and other factors on CO
2
 emissions and not envi-
ronmental quality. Furthermore, environmental quality encompasses 
much more than CO
2
 emissions. These estimates should be interpreted 
with caution when addressing environmental quality directly. Second, 
the coefficients may be driven by recent concerns about climate 
change that indicate CO
2
 as its main cause. Consequently, policies 




Also, results should be interpreted with caution because such a 
short period (1995-2008) does not capture the long-term relation-
ship between democracy and environmental quality. Furthermore, 
I have omitted important variables such as political participation, 
social movements, environmental agreements and regulations. This 
should not alter the results substantially because of the fixed effects 
approach; however, this method impedes determining the empirical 
importance of these variables, already highlighted in the literature.
Finally, this paper has taken a positive view of the impact of 
democracy on environmental quality, a controversial stand. In fact, 
the literature provides compelling arguments regarding the possible 
detrimental effects of democracy on society—the tyranny of the ma-
jority. This may be consistent with a narrow definition of democracy 
(decisions based on a majority rule), but democracy nonetheless.
6. CONCLUsIONs
Democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality. The 
theory suggests that democracy sustains and encourages freedom of 
speech, freedom of press, political participation and social awareness. 
These elements provide a conduit for social demands. As the urban 
population and income grow, citizens increase their demands for 
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higher environmental standards and quality. The enactment of new 
policies and regulations that incentive individuals and firms lead 
to a reduction in pollution; therefore, leading to a higher level of 
environmental quality. 
In fact, democratic societies are prone to have a higher rule of law. 
Thus, social demands for a cleaner environment transform into bills 
and laws that are applied effectively. If demands are unmet, gover-
nments may be removed from office by using its system of checks 
and balances and public accountability. The theoretical model in 
this paper argues that citizens will be empowered to change the law 
and remove politicians from government the higher their levels of 
education, wealth and political engagement.
Moreover, societies with a higher percentage of youth, urban 
population and a lesser level of inequality and corruption, encourage 
pro-environmental behavior, civic engagement and political partici-
pation. Specifically, this study explores three hypotheses: An increase 
in democracy improves environmental quality, in countries with low 
levels of education; higher levels of education increase environmental 
quality, in nations with low levels of democracy; and, an increase in 
GDP per capita reduces environmental quality.
In order to verify these hypotheses, this study uses data for 19 Latin 
American countries from 1995 and 2008, in a panel data multiple 
equations approach. In doing so, this study controls from any feedback 
effects between economic prosperity and environmental quality. And 
the selected time frame and sample provide indicators and variables 
with sufficient reliability, accuracy, variability and stability to obtain 
robust inferences and conclusions. Thus, all three hypotheses are 
confirmed through conclusive and robust statistical evidence. 
Furthermore, this study suggests that a 10% increase in democracy 
reduces CO
2
 emissions per capita in 0.48% or 0.60%. Similarly, a 10% 
increase in education decreases emissions in 0.71% or 0.73%. These 
results advocate that democracy and education have a positive effect 
on environmental quality, acting as substitutes. Although multiple 
factors promote clean habitats, voting for the environment by promo-
ting more education and democracy seems a promising starting point.
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